SEE ALSO:
http://tweedlandthegentlemansclub.blogspot.com/2013/10/raymond-erith-new-classical-architect.html
Rebuilding No. 10 Downing Street
Posted by:jackbrown, Posted on:19 July 2017 -
Categories:No 10 guest historian series, Past prime ministers, Prime Ministers
and No. 10, Researcher in residence, The National Archives, Uncategorized
https://history.blog.gov.uk/2017/07/19/rebuilding-no-10-downing-street/
Researcher
in Residence: Progress Report IV
My name is
Jack Brown and I am the first ‘Researcher in Residence’ at No. 10 Downing
Street, based at the Policy Institute at King’s, King’s College London. I have
been investigating the ‘Geography of Power’ at the centre of British
Government, and the important two-way relationship between No. 10 as a building
and those that work and live within it. This blog series focuses on the reconstruction
of No. 10 during Harold Macmillan’s premiership.
This is the
fourth and final entry in a series of blog posts on the topic. The first blog
provides the historical background to the rebuilding; the second focuses on the
associated ‘geography of power’ decisions and the reconsidering of No. 10’s
layout; and the third blog examines how the Prime Minister intervened in the
redesigning of No. 10 and its surrounding buildings. This fourth and final part
investigates the reconstruction of No. 10 itself, Harold Macmillan’s final
attempts to intervene, and offers some concluding thoughts on the series.
This series
is part of the research for an upcoming book on the ‘Geography of Power at No.
10 Downing Street’, to be published by Haus Publishing in 2018.
A ‘Rather
Sudden’ Decision
In July
1957, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan appointed the independent Crawford
Committee to investigate and recommend a course of action for dealing with the
deteriorating buildings at Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Downing Street. It reported less
than a year later, recommending that the existing structures be substantially
rebuilt, with the Prime Minister temporarily rehoused in the interim. The
Cabinet endorsed this course of action in May 1958, and the architect Raymond
Erith was chosen to oversee this major project. Erith, a self-described
‘progressive classicist’, was to work alongside, but independently of, the
Ministry of Works.[i]
The
Ministry selected construction firm Mowlem as the contractor for the job, and
were pleased to note that Mowlem’s tender was not only the cheapest received,
but in fact appeared to be so low in cost as to be ‘evidently loss making’.[ii]
The prestige of the job, it seems, was reward enough for Mowlem. As the
Minister of Works, Lord John Hope, informed the Prime Minister, the next best
tender was expected to cost £10,500 more.[iii] This ultimately seems to have
offset the concerns of both Erith and the Prime Minister that the firm lacked
experience.[iv]
Raymond
Erith dispatched an assistant to performed limited surveys of the Downing
Street houses to assess their condition in the winter of 1958/9.[v]
Unfortunately, the extent of these surveys was necessarily restricted by the
Prime Minister’s reluctance to move out while they were undertaken. The upcoming
renovation of the houses was subsequently estimated to cost £464,000, based
upon what little was then known about the condition of the buildings. The
decision to go ahead was described by the Ministry of Works as a ‘rather
sudden’ one, and the Macmillans moved out of Downing Street, and into Admiralty
House, in August 1960. Despite the rush, the Prime Minister was eager to return
to the iconic No. 10 as soon as possible, and was influential in setting a
target of August 1962 for his return.[vi] However, as Macmillan biographer
Alistair Horne describes, ‘anyone with Macmillan’s experience of British
building methods could have foreseen’ that this ambition was likely to prove
optimistic.[vii]
Unpleasant
Surprises
It soon
became clear that the houses at Downing Street were in a much worse condition
than had first been indicated. A team of ex-miners, sent down to reconstruct
the houses’ timber foundations, found them shallow and severely water damaged,
rotted and crumbling.[viii] The walls of Downing Street’s superstructure were
found to consist of rubble with timber, rather than proper brickwork, creating
the ideal conditions for dry rot. Many were also suffering from insect damage.
Wartime strengthening work on several of No. 10’s floors, performed alongside the
construction of an air raid shelter in the basement, had proved inadequate,
leaving several rooms unstable.[ix] Many of the diseased walls were also
significantly ‘out of true’ (i.e. not properly aligned) and structurally
unsound; the BBC’s Christopher Jones recorded that in some cases, ‘apparently
solid walls were held up only by the plaster covering them’.[x]
Ultimately,
more than half of the existing fabric of the building had to be renewed, with
the foundations substantially underpinned, the main brick walls grouted or
reconstructed entirely, all roofs and most floors replaced, and modern services
installed, alongside the planned structural alterations designed to expand and
improve No. 10’s working spaces.[xi] A great deal of wood treatment was required
throughout to try and prevent future deterioration; in some cases, repairs on
internal doors became so intricate that they ended up costing two or three
times the value of a new door.[xii]
As early as
April 1961, it had become clear that the original anticipated completion date
for the Downing Street houses had already become unachievable. A letter from
Mowlem to architect Raymond Erith struck a pessimistic tone:
We have
felt rather concerned during the last few months about the many problems arising
on the work at Nos. 10 and 11 Downing Street. We think you will agree that as
the pulling down has proceeded, it has been found that far more complete
restoration work will be necessary than may have been envisaged before work
started, owing to the state of the existing buildings.[xiii]
The letter
also cited the high quality of the services, decorations and details demanded
by the building – and by Erith himself – as an additional cause for delay.
Noting that Downing Street was the home and office of the British Prime
Minister, and not simply ‘a very plain office type of building’, the
contractors expected that more time would be required to complete it.[xiv]
Unfortunately, further delays were just around the corner.
The
Importance of Tea Breaks
It is
perhaps appropriate that work on such an historic British building was
disrupted by a dispute over cups of tea. Tools were downed at Downing Street on
2nd October 1961, alongside a number of sites across London, in response to a
new Working Rule, which saw weekly working hours reduced, but with the caveat
that tea breaks would no longer be paid. The strike began unofficially, but was
declared official on 4th October by the Amalgamated Union of Painters and
Decorators. Most affiliated unions followed next day. The Minister of Works now
considered the target for completion of August 1962 as increasingly unlikely,
noting that a fortnight’s ideal weather had been lost. A suggested compromise –
bringing tea out to the men without a formal break in what was described as a
‘free tea’ solution – was rejected.[xv]
By November
1961, it was reported that the Downing Street programme was three months
behind, although much of this delay was attributed to the unexpectedly high
level of refurbishment work required, rather than the strikes.[xvi] A revised
estimate predicted that works on Downing Street would cost £100,000 more than
first envisaged. One year later, this figure rose once more, to £300,000.
Whilst structural problems with the buildings were continuing to drive up
costs, a series of strikes over the preceding 12 months, including a plumbers’
strike from May-August 1962 that had shut down the site completely, were now
taking their toll.[xvii]
By May
1962, Erith was becoming increasingly panicked by events at Downing Street. The
architect wrote to the Ministry of Works to inform them that:
As you know
I have for some time been worried about the state of affairs at Downing Street.
So far as I can see the plumbers’ strike is no nearer to a settlement than it ever
was. The labour force is out of balance, the men appear to be doing next to
nothing, and the contractor seems to be helpless.
The
architect stated that it was not his business, or his decision to make, but
urged the government to intervene and make a substantial change in the existing
arrangements: ‘money is so obviously being wasted.’[xviii]
Erith was
also critical of the contractors themselves: ‘I think everyone is far too ready
to see Mowlem’s difficulties and cannot help feeling that what is really wanted
is a good kick in the pants all round.’[xix] The architect claimed that the
contractors had ‘somehow managed to infect almost everyone else on the site
with a defeatist attitude’ that made delays inevitable, and also complained
about ‘red tape’ from the Ministry of Works holding up decisions.[xx] For their
part, the contractors found it difficult to work with Erith, citing his
fixation on detail and tendency to change his mind at the last minute.[xxi]
The
anticipated deadline for completion was extended further, and set at August
1963 for Downing Street and October of the same year for William Kent’s
Treasury building. A bonus system was brought in to incentivise rapid
completion of the works, with the Ministry of Works noting with some concern that
Parliament had show ‘considerable interest’ in the lack of progress on Downing
Street.[xxii]
One further
factor also complicated the works on Downing Street. Harold Macmillan had been
acutely aware of public perceptions from the start of the process, with the
appointment of the Crawford Committee designed as a counter to accusations that
the Prime Minister was spending public money on improving Downing Street at his
own volition. This concern continued throughout the process. As a member of
Erith’s office staff told historian Anthony Seldon: ‘The principal point
Macmillan impressed on Erith was that the rebuilding should not look
expensive.’[xxiii] However, Erith’s vision for No. 10 did not sit easily
alongside this advice.
A letter to
a Ministry official from the final stages of the project in December 1962
reveals the depths of Erith’s anguish over the Prime Minister’s insistence that
as plain and unpretentious decoration as possible be used to finish Downing
Street’s interiors:
I ought to
have written to you sooner but after I saw you I felt too despondent to say
anything (…) For the last 4 ½ years most of my time and thought has been spent
on Downing Street. Now, when the time has come for the final effort needed to
set the whole thing off I am told in effect that the house is to be virtually
undecorated (…) The only way to justify what we have done is by making the
place look as if it was worth keeping (…) At the end of this job I want people
to say, “My word, this house is something, of course they were right to keep
it”.[xxiv]
Continued
and expensive delays to construction at Downing Street also led the Ministry of
Works to insist on economies being made in the finishing of the house wherever
possible. Erith stated with regret that he now feared that the press would
greet the reconstructed Downing Street with disappointment and criticism: ‘Is
this all we get for £900,000?’[xxv]
In
addition, Erith complained that both Harold and Lady Dorothy Macmillan seemed
not to trust his judgement. The architect appeared on the verge of resigning
over the finishing of No. 10, and particularly the historic Cabinet Room, which
the Macmillans were insisting on decorating as plainly as possible:
The P.M.
thinks what I shall do will look extravagant, and probably both he and Lady
Dorothy think that anything but cream or pastel shades might look out of place
or ridiculous in some way or other. (…) If the Prime Minister and Lady Dorothy
have no confidence in me I hope they will find someone else who could do the
job properly and who they trust.[xxvi]
Erith asked
the Ministry of Works to convey his displeasure to the Prime Minister, ‘without
being so tactful that he does not know what it is about’.[xxvii] Ministry
officials replied, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the present Prime Minister was
ultimately in charge of the works, and that his ‘personal tastes’ had to be
accepted.[xxviii]
Despite his
own personal feelings on the matter, Erith was obliged to carry out the Prime
Minister’s wishes. As a biography of the architect notes, he was
‘heartbroken’.[xxix] Erith was a classicist, seeking to accurately restore the
historic buildings to their former glory. He appears to have regarded the
public sector’s ‘economy campaign’ as philistine, confiding to a friend that:
‘They are talking about using good modern furniture. I asked if bad modern
would not be cheaper still. They said, quite seriously, no they didn’t think
so. I despair.’[xxx]
Not Quite
Finished…
The Prime
Minister moved back into Downing Street in September 1963, more than a year
later than had been first anticipated. As Alistair Horne surmises, ‘Despite the
greater space and finer rooms of Admiralty House, he was glad to be back; the
“atmosphere of its historic past” doubtless made it all the harder to
contemplate leaving, and he thought the architect and builders had “certainly
done a good job” at No. 10’.[xxxi] The Old Treasury, now home to the Cabinet
Office, would be ready for occupation the following year.
The Downing
Street part of the contracted works, estimated at £400,000 when the initial
decision was taken to rebuild, and £464,000 following a limited survey in the
winter of 1958/9, had ended up costing £1.15 million. Strikes were blamed for
an estimated £208,000 of the Downing Street expenditure.[xxxii] The
unexpectedly poor condition of the houses, and the high quality of the work
that Erith demanded, accounted for the remainder. Unfortunately, however,
expenditure on the reconstruction of No. 10 Downing Street was not yet
complete.
In 1964,
dry rot was discovered in the State Dining Room, in the second floor toilet,
and under the Cabinet Room patio. The following year, it was found in the State
Drawing Room (otherwise known as the Pillared Room).[xxxiii] Prime Minister
Harold Wilson initially tried to keep the problem quiet, coming so soon after
what had been branded a full overhaul of No. 10 between 1959-63.[xxxiv] Wilson
ordered a full investigation to be performed, before news of the issue became
public.
Raymond
Erith ultimately accepted blame for the oversight, but claimed that the only
way of avoiding the possibility of dry rot ‘would have been to raze the
building to the ground and start afresh’. It was possible that the dry rot had
been ‘activated’ by a leak from an pipe accidentally burst by Mowlem during
restorative works on the house; regardless, the problem was attributed to a
‘technical, rather than a political’ error, which had occurred against a
background of spiralling costs, and was seen as understandable if inconvenient
for the Prime Minister to explain to the public.[xxxv] Wilson finally accepted
the need for repairs to be undertaken in 1966, although the serious disruption
caused by this work led to its being terminated before the Ministry of Works
felt that it was fully complete.[xxxvi]
By 1969,
discolouration was found on the walls in the White Drawing Room, making it
almost certain that dry rot was also present there. Whilst No. 10’s occupants
were reported to be in a state of denial regarding the extent of the problem,
the Ministry of Works regarded this ‘wishful thinking’, with potentially
serious consequences: ‘the most alarming aspect is the (admittedly slight)
possibility of collapse; the concrete ceilings are held up only by low grade
brickwork, powdering mortar and rotting timber.’[xxxvii] Prime Minister Edward
Heath eventually had to accept that even more disruptive work was required and
unavoidable, and work was finally complete by 1973, ten years after Raymond
Erith’s initial revamp of Downing Street had come to its end.[xxxviii]
Was It All
Worth It?
Not all
agreed that restoring No. 10 Downing Street had been the correct choice. In a
note to Prime Minister Harold Wilson explaining the need for 1966’s dry rot
works at Downing Street, the Minister of Public Building and Works analysed the
building’s recent reconstruction, in an attempt to glean some lessons from the
No. 10 experience. Considering that the original estimate for No. 10’s
reconstruction under Harold Macmillan had more than doubled, without including
the additional dry rot treatment that was later required under Wilson and
Heath, he concluded that:
If this
first estimate had been realistic, the course followed was prudent, but for the
final cost, we could probably have rebuilt the house completely. (…) My
conclusion is that all that has gone here is a risk inherent where selection
between one part and another has to be made in the rehabilitation of an old
building.[xxxix]
Noting how
intrusive the post-1963 works to repair dry rot had been to the operation of
No. 10, Appointments Secretary John Hewitt was reported to have said in 1971
that ‘the terms of reference of the Crawford Committee were misconceived and
that No 10 should have been pulled down. He still believed that this would be
the best policy if the PM was going to be upset every two or three years [by
further remedial works].’[xl]
However, it
seems appropriate to return here to the words of the Crawford Committee, who
had first concluded that Downing Street must be preserved and renovated. Having
investigated the option of rebuilding, or simply moving the Prime Minister
elsewhere, the Committee concluded that: ‘The houses, and especially No. 10,
have many historical associations and we should deplore their demolition.’[xli]
Whilst it was possible (but equally far from certain) that an entirely new
building could have been constructed for a similar or even lower cost, the
decision had been taken that the hundreds of years of history contained within
the short row of terraced houses in Downing Street was worth preserving.
Concluding
Thoughts
Prior to
Erith’s rebuilding, No. 10 Downing Street was in an intolerable state, and had
become an unsuitable base for the modern premiership. The extent to which it
had become unfit for purpose was illustrated during US President Dwight
Eisenhower’s famous televised ‘fireside chat’ at No. 10 with Harold Macmillan,
in the runup to the 1959 general election. The President of the United States,
visiting for an unprecedented and historic live television broadcast with the
Prime Minister, was said to have been concerned that the floor could give way
under the weight of the television cameramen and their equipment.[xlii]
Such was
the historic importance and charm of the building that successive Prime
Ministers had stalled or avoided the substantial rebuilding that Harold
Macmillan finally sanctioned, which saw him uprooted and housed in temporary
accommodation for almost half of his premiership. However, these works meant
that the Downing Street houses were made more robust than they had been for
over 200 years, with the historic first-floor State Rooms and Cabinet suite of
rooms preserved for posterity and the building’s capacity for both living and
working vastly improved.
Downing
Street was now a much more effective home and office for the British Prime
Minister. To start with, the houses were no longer a fire risk, and for the
first time in many years, it was no longer necessary to employ an industrial
fireman fulltime to watch over the building.[xliii] With the building’s
foundations strengthened, the same was true of the permanent on-site carpenter,
who had previously been retained to constantly adjust No. 10’s windows and
doors as they moved in and out of true.[xliv] Modern services were installed,
and some degree of sense was made of the building’s mishmash of hundreds of
years of architectural adjustments. No. 10 was expanded, with the Chancellor
pushed out towards No. 12 Downing Street, which was rebuilt to its former
height in red brick (Nos. 10 and 11 had their brickwork painted black, to mimic
the sooty appearance they had before renovation). Additional office space was
opened up on the upper floors, and the building’s capacity was expanded as well
as improved in quality.
By
retaining the bulk of Downing Street’s historic buildings, a sense of No. 10’s
past was preserved, which still has a powerful impact upon those who work
within it today. Harold Wilson, who was Prime Minister for almost eight years
over two separate terms, pondered the significance of the building’s history in
a 1975 interview with the BBC World Service: ‘I think that unless you have a
sense of history, and of tradition, and of the people who have been there, you
can’t apply yourself to the problems of the present.’[xlv] Margaret Thatcher,
No. 10’s longest twentieth-century resident, keenly felt 250 years of great
historical moments resonating throughout the building:
All Prime
Ministers are intensely aware that, as tenants and stewards of No.10 Downing
Street, they have in their charge one of the most precious jewels in the
nation's heritage. It is a heritage which every Prime Minister guards with care
and affection (…) the feeling of Britain’s historic greatness which pervades
every nook and cranny of this complicated and meandering old building.[xlvi]
Whilst
still ‘complicated and meandering’ today, despite numerous further adaptations,
No. 10 Downing Street remains a house full of history, intrigue and power. It
is also one of the most famous houses, with one of the most famous front doors,
in the world. Its history is fascinating and significant. Long may it be
preserved.
Acknowledgements
This series
of blogs are part of a wider research project on the postwar ‘Geography of
Power’ at No.10 Downing Street, to be published in 2018 by Haus Publishing.
This
project has been made possible by the generous support of the Strand Group; the
Policy Institute at King’s, King’s College London; Hewlett Packard Enterprise;
King’s College London’s Widening Participation Department; the Brilliant Club
and No. 10 Downing Street. Special thanks are owed to Jan Gökçen for research
assistance.
Notes
[i] L.
Archer (ed.), Raymond Erith: Progressive Classicist 1904-1973 (Salisbury: Sir
John Soane’s Museum, 2004), pp.14-7
[ii]
Ministry of Works, ‘Post War History of Work at Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Downing Street’,
attached to: P. F. Hicks to PS/Secretary, ‘No 10 Downing Street’, 16/7/70,
National Archives, WORK 12/580
[iii] J.
Hope to Prime Minister, ‘Downing Street Contract’, 5/4/60, Erith Archives,
ErR/100/1
[iv] D.
Stephens to R. Erith, ‘Downing Street Reconstruction’, 28/3/60, Erith Archives,
ErR/100/1, and; Prime Minister to Minister of Works, ‘Downing Street Contract’,
2/4/60, Erith Archives, ErR/100/1, and; R. Erith to D. Stephens, ‘Downing
Street Reconstruction’ 7/4/60, Erith Archives, ErR/100/1
[v] Ministry
of Works, ‘Post War History of Work at Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Downing Street’
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] A.
Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Official Biography (London:
Macmillan, 1989), p.266
[viii] C.
Jones, No.10 Downing Street: The Story of a House (London: BBC, 1985), p.154
[ix] R. J.
Minney, No.10 Downing Street: A House in History (Boston: Little, Brown &
Co., 1963), p.429-30
[x] Jones,
No.10 Downing Street, p.154
[xi]
Archer, Raymond Erith, p.55
[xii]
Jones, No.10 Downing Street, p.154
[xiii] John
Mowlem and Co. Ltd. to R. Erith, ‘Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Downing Street, S.E.1’,
24/4/61, Erith Archives, ErR/103/2
[xiv] Ibid.
[xv] A. S.
Lee to R. Erith, Untitled Letter, 12/10/61, Erith Archives, ErR/101/4
[xvi]
Author unknown, ‘Report on Downing Street’ 28/11/61, Erith Archives, ErR/103/2
[xvii]
Ministry of Works, ‘Post War History of Work at Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Downing
Street’
[xviii] R.
Erith to M. Bennitt, untitled letter, 1/5/62, Erith Archives, ErR/100/1
[xix] R.
Erith to M. Bennitt, 22/5/62, Erith Archives, ErR/100/1
[xx] R.
Erith to K. Newis, untitled letter, 19/4/63, NA, CM23/177, and; R. Erith to F.
R. Rothwell, untitled letter, 31/5/61, NA, CM23/175
[xxi] G. R.
Lock to J. E. Jones, ‘Downing Street and Treasury Reconstruction’, 4/4/63, NA,
CM 23/177
[xxii]
Ministry of Works, ‘Post War History of Work at Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Downing
Street’
[xxiii] A.
Seldon, 10 Downing Street: An Illustrated History (London: HarperCollins,
1990), p.34
[xxiv] R.
Erith to M. W. Bennitt, untitled letter, 4/12/62, Erith Archives, ErR/103/3
[xxv] Ibid.
[xxvi]
Ibid.
[xxvii]
Ibid.
[xxviii] M.
W. Bennitt to R. Erith, untitled letter, 27/12/62, Erith Archives, ErR/103/3
[xxix]
Archer, Raymond Erith, p.57
[xxx] R.
Erith to D. Hicks, Untitled Letter, 4/4/63, Erith Archives, ErR/103/2
[xxxi]
Horne, Macmillan, p.535
[xxxii]
Ministry of Works, ‘Post War History of Work at Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Downing
Street’
[xxxiii] R.
Erith to D. Hicks, Untitled Letter, 4/4/63
[xxxiv] R.
G. Jones to K. Newis, Confidential Note, 17/9/65, NA, WORK 12/580
[xxxv]
Charles Pannell to Prime Minister, ‘State Drawing Room’, 24/11/65, NA, WORK
12/580
[xxxvi] R.
Kemp to J. Stevens, ‘Nos 10, 11 and 12 Downing Street’, 28/6/73, NA, WORK
12/580
[xxxvii]
Ministry of Works, ‘Post War History of Work at Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Downing
Street’
[xxxviii]
R. Kemp to J. Stevens, ‘Nos 10, 11 and 12 Downing Street’, 28/6/73
[xxxix]
Charles Pannell to Prime Minister, ‘State Drawing Room’, 24/11/65
[xl] P. F.
Hicks, ‘Note of Meeting held at No 10 Downing Street on 26 January at 11am’,
4/2/71, NA, WORK 12/580
[xli]
Committee on the Preservation of Downing Street, Report of the Committee on the
Preservation of Downing Street (London: HMSO, June 1958), p.7
[xlii]
Horne, Macmillan, p.657
[xliii] D.
Andrews to Senior Fire Surveyor, ‘10/12 Downing Street’, 10/7/63, NA, CM23/177
[xliv]
Seldon, 10 Downing Street, p.29
[xlv] H.
Wilson, The Governance of Britain (London: Book Club Associates, 1976), p.106
[xlvi] M.
Thatcher, in Jones, No.10 Downing Street, foreword
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